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NAALC Submissions and Final Outcomes Concerning the Maquiladora Zone
Number and Date of Filing

NAALC Principle Allegedly Violated

Level of Review and Outcome

US NAO No. 940001 &No. 94002,
Febmary 14, 1994
US NAO No. 940003, August 16,
1994
Mexican NAO 950 1

Freedom of Expression and Right to Organize Independent Unions

Freedom of Association and Right to Organize

US NSO No. 9601, June 13, 1996

Freedom of Association

US NAO No. 9701, May 16,1997

Gender Discrimination

US NAO No. 9702, Oct. 30, 1997

Freedom of Association and Health and Safety

US NAO No. 9703, Dec. 15, 1997
Mexican NAO 9801, April 13, 1998

Freedom of Association and Health and Safety
Right to Organize Collectively; Occupational Health and Safety; Overtime
Pay
Freedom of Association and Right to Organize; Right to Bargain
Collectively; Minimum Employment Standards; Occupational Health and
Safety; Protection of Migrant Workers
Occupational Health and Safety; Minimum Employment Standards;
Protection of Migrant Workers
Health and Safety: INS and DOL had Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) that required DOL investigators to inquire into the legal residency
of workers who reported health and safety violations and to report their
suspicions to the INS.
Freedom of Association, Minimum Employment Standards, and
Occupational Safety and Health Regulations
Occupational Health and Safety; and unjust administrative proceedings
Occupational Health and Safety and Compensation in Cases of
Occupational Injuries and Illnesses
Freedom of Association

Informal Meetings among the US, Mexico
and Canada
Ministerial Consultations and Follow-up
Report
Ministerial Consultations, public meeting in
San Francisco, and publication by the
Secretariat entitled, "Plant Closings and
Labor Rights."
Hearing in Washington, DC on January 27,
1996 and Ministerial Consultations
Ministerial Consultations, conferences and
public forms in three cities along the USMexiw border
Ministerial Consultations; Tri-national
public seminars on both freedom of
association and health and safety concerns
Ministerial Consultations
Ministerial Consultations

Mexican NAO 9802, May 27, 1998
Mexican NAO 9803, August 10,
1998
Canada NAO 98-2
Mexican NAO 9804
US NAO No. 9901, November 10,
1999
Mexican NAO 2001-1
US NAO No. 2000-01, July 3,2000
US NAO No. 2001-01, June 29,2001

Freedom of Expression and Right to Organize Independent Unions

Ministerial Consultations
Ministerial Consultations
INS and DOL created new MOU that
superceded the other that canceled the
former policy
Ministerial Consultations
No action at time of writing
Ministerial Consultation
Submission rejected for review February 22,
2002

Chronological List of all filings at the US NAO NAALC
Concerning the Maquiladora Zone and Action Taken

Number and Date of
Filing

Complaining Party

US NAO No. 940001 &
No. 94002, February 14,
1994
US NAO No. 940003,
August 16, 1994

IBT & UE

Mexican NAO 9501

US NSO No. 9601, June
13, 1996

Sindicato de
Telefonistas de la
Repfiblica Mexicana
(Telephone Workers of
the Republic of
Mexico)
ILRF, HRW, and
ANAD

US NAO No. 9701, May
16,1997

ILRF, HRW, and
ANAD

US NAO No. 9702,
October 30, 1997

Freedom of association:
SCMW, ILRF, ANAD
and Sindicato de
Trabajadores de la
Industria Metalica,

ILRF

Company and
Country Alleged in
Violation
Honeywell and
General Electric Plants
-Mexico
Sony - Mexico
Sprint - United States

Sindicato Unico de
Trabajadores de la
Secretaria de Pesca
(SUTSP, or the
Mexican Fisheries
Union)
Entire Mexican
Maquiladora Industry

Han Young
maquiladora in
Tijuana, Baja
California, Mexico

Claim

Level of Review and Final Outcome

Freedom of Expression
and Right to Organize
Independent Unions
Freedom of Expression
and Right to Organize
Independent Unions
Freedom of Association
and Right to Organize

Informal Meetings among the US, Mexico and
Canada

Freedom of Association

Gender Discrimination

Freedom of Association
and Health and Safety

Ministerial Consultations and Follow-up Report
Ministerial Consultations between the Mexican
Secretary of Labor and the United States
Secretary of Labor. Public forum in San
Francisco, CA, USA. Publication by the
Secretariat entitled, "Plant Closings and Labor
Rights."
Hearing in Washington, DC on January 27, 1996
and Ministerial Consultations

Public Hearing in Brownsville, Texas, United
States on November 1997; Conference on
"Protecting the Labor Rights of Working
Women" in Merida, Yucatan, Mexico; outreach
sessions to teach female workers their rights
under Mexican Federal Law in McAllen, Texas,
United States and Reynosa, Tamaulipas, Mexico
Ministerial Consultations; Tri-national public
seminars on both freedom of association and
health and safety concerns

Acero, Hierro. Conexos
y Sirnilares (Mexican
Union of Metal, Steel,
Iron, and Allied
Workers STIHMACS)
Health and Safety:
Maquiladora Health and
Safety Support
Network, Worksafe!
Southern California,
USWA, UAW and
CAW
Echlin Workers
Alliance

-

US NAO No. 9703,
December 15, 1997

Mexican NAO 9801, April
13, 1998

Mexican NAO 9802, May
27, 1998

Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers
International Union,
Local 1-675; Sindicato
de Trabajadores de
Industria y Comercio "6
de octubre"; the Union
de Defensa Laboral
Cornunitaria; and the
Comite de Apoyo para
10s trabajadores de las
Maquiladoras
Uni6n Nacional de
Trabajadores (UNT),
Frente Autkntico del
Trabajo (FAT), Frente
Democritico
Campesino (FDC), and
the Sindicato de
Trabajadores de la
Industria Methlica,

ltapsa processing plant,
Ciudad de 10s Reyes,
Mexico, Mexico

Freedom of Association
and Health and Safety

Soltec International,
Inc. and NLRB
generally - United
States

Right to Organize
Collectively;
Occupational Health and
Safety; Overtime Pay

Migrant workers in the
apple industry in
Washington state, and
NLRB generally - US.

Freedom of Association
and Right to Organize;
Right to Bargain
Collectively; Minimum
Employment Standards;
Occupational Health and
Safety; Protection of
Migrant Workers

Ministerial Consultations. Mexico agreed to
ensure Mexican workers are provided with
information regarding their right to bargain
collectively and to promote the use of voter lists
and secret ballots for union elections. No time
6ame or methods for administering these
objectives were included.
Ministerial Consultations, Sept., 1999. As part of
the plan of action contained in the agreement, the
U.S. NAO hosted the Mexican NAO in a
government-to-government meeting held in
Washington, D.C. on May 23 and 24,2001, with
a follow-up session in Mexico City the week
after. The U.S. NAO organized public forums in
Yakima, Washington, on August 8,2001, and in
Augusta, Maine on June 5,2002. The plan of
action also called for a 'inational guide on
migrant workers, which the Secretariat has
submitted to the Council of Ministers.
Ministerial Consultations, Sept., 1999. As part of
the plan of action contained in the agreement, the
U.S. NAO hosted the Mexican NAO in a
government-to-government meeting held in
Washington, D.C. on May 23 and 24,2001, with
a follow-up session in Mexico City the week
after. The U.S. NAO organized public forums in
Yakima, Washington, on August 8,2001, and in
Augusta, Maine on June 5,2002. The plan of

Mexican NAO 9803,
August 10, 1998

Acero, Hierro, Conexos
y Similares
(STIMACHS), assisted
by the International
Labor Rights Fund
Confederaci6n de
DeCoster Egg Farm
Trabajadores de M6xico Maine, USA
(CTM)

Canada NAO 98-2
Mexican NAO 9804

Yale Law School
Workers' Rights Project
and the
ACLU Foundation
Immigrants' Rights
Project

United States INS and
DOL.

US NAO No. 9901,
November 10,1999

The United States
Association of Flight
Attendants and the
Association of Flight
Attendants of Mexico
(ASSA)
Individual Workers and
several immigrant
worker rights
organizations,
including, Chinese Staff

Executive Air
Transport, Inc. of
Mexico

Mexican NAO 2001-1

New York state
Workers'
Compensation System

action also called for a trinational guide on
migrant workers, which the Secretariat has
submitted to the Council of Ministers
Occupational Health and
Safety; Minimum
Employment Standards;
Protection of Migrant
Workers

Health and Safety: INS
and DOL had
Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU)
that required DOL
investigators to inquire
into the legal residency
of workers who reported
health and safety
violations and to report
their suspicions to the
INS.
Freedom of Association,
Minimum Employment
Standards, and
Occupational Safety and
Health Regulations
Occupational Health and
Safety; and NAALC
Article 5(l)(d) obligation
to ensure that
administrative

Ministerial Consultations, Sept., 1999. As pan of
the plan of action contained in the agreement, the
U.S. NAO hosted the Mexican NAO in a
government-to-government meeting held in
Washington, D.C. on May 23 and 24,2001, with
a follow-up session in Mexico City the week
after. The U.S. NAO organized public forums in
Yakima, Washington, on August 8,2001, and in
Augusta, Maine on June 5,2002. The plan of
action also called for a trinational guide on
migrant workers, which the Secretariat has
submitted to the Council of Ministers.
INS and DOL created new MOU that superceded
the other that canceled the former policy.

Public hearing in March 2000 in Washington,
DC. Public report issued on July 7,2000
recommending ministerial consultations.
Agreement for ministerial consultations signed
on July 24,2001.
No action as of this writing.

Chronological List of Chapter 1 1 Filings and Action Taken
Filing
Date
April
1997

Complaining
Party
Ethyl
Corporation

Country
Denounced
Canada

Arbitration Alleged Illegal Action Taken
Rules
UNCITRAL The Canadian parliament banned the in~portation
of the chemical MMT, which Ethyl Corporation
produced in the United States. However, the
parliament did not ban the chemical in Canada.

January
2, 1997

Metalclad

Mexico

ICSID

Metalclad received permission to construct a
hazardous waste materials facility in outside the
community of Guadalcazar, San Luis Potosi,
Mexico from the Federal Government of Mexico.
The governor of San Luis Potosi state and the
local leaders of the town of Guadalcazar
repeatedly prohibited the company from
constructing its facility by blocking the entrance
to the site with protests and eventually state
troopers. The governor subsequently declared
the area to be a protected ecological zone.

October
30,
1998

S.D. Myers

Canada

UNCITRAL

S.D. Myers sought to export PCBs to the United
States from Canada. Canadian law only allowed
the exportation of PCBs if the United States
agreed. S.D. Myers obtained a importation
permit kom the US in 1995. It then exported

Chapter I I Article(s) Filed Under and Final
Outcome
Article I1 10: Expropriation.
Article 1102: National Treatment.
Article 1 106: Local performance requirement.
The arbitration panel rejected the Canadian
arguments that the parliament's action was not a
"measure" under NAFTA on June 24, 1998.
On July 20, 1998, the Canadian Parliament
reversed its ban on the importation of MMT and
paid Ethyl Corporation $13 million in legal fees
and damages. The Canadian parliament also
issued a public statement stating, '"cwent
scientific information' did not demonstrate
MMT's toxicity or that MMT impairs functioning
of automotive diagnostic systems." Payment and
statement were issued within a year and three
months.
Article 11 10: Expropriation.
Article 1105: Failure to Provide Fair and Equitable
Treatment.
The arbitration panel awarded Metalclad $16.7
million in damages on August 30,2000.
Mexico appealed the decision to the British
Columbia state courts under ICSID rules.
The British Columbia court held, in a split
decision, that the ruling was correct, except the
date of the expropriation. It therefore lowered the
award to $15.6 million.
On June 13,2001, Metalclad announced Mexico
decided to pay the full amount.
Article 1102: National Treatment.
Article 1105: Minimum Standards of Treatment.
Article 1106: Performance Requirements.
Article I1 10: Expropriation.
On November 13,2000, the arbitration panel

seven shipments from Canada to the US. One
month after receiving its export permit, Canada
revoked it. Then, sixteen months later, a US
Federal Judge issued an order stopping all
shipments of PCBs into the US. S.D. Myers sued
for lost profits during the sixteen-month period
when the US still allowed the importation of
PCBs, but Canada did not allow their export.
A jury in Mississippi found the Canadian-based
Loewen Group guilty of unlawful and anticompetitive acts in trying to purchase funeral
homes. The jury eventually awarded the
plaintiffs $500 million in damages.
The Mississippi Supreme Court refused to waive
the normal requirement of posting a bond prior to
appealing a decision.
The corporation settled with the plaintiffs for
$150 million.

October
30,
1998

Loewen
Group

United
States

ICSlD

March
25,
1999

Pope & Talbot

Canada

UNCITRAL Pope & Talbot is based in Oregon, US,
and operates several sawmills in British
Columbia, Canada.
The lumber exported from British
Columbia by Pope & Talbot was subject
to the Sofhvood Lumber Agreement
between the US and Canada.
Pope & Talbot filed the Chapter 11
claim because the timber it wanted to
export was subject to the Agreement,
while timber exported from other parts
of Canada was not.

Article
Article
Article
Article

rejected S.D. Myers' Article 1106 and I 1 10 claims
and upheld the others. It held that S.D. Myers'
share of the Canadian PCB market was an
"investment" under NAFTA.
On October 21,2002, the arbitration panel ordered
Canada to pay S.D. Myers nearly seven million in
damages, costs and interest.
Article 1102: National Treatment.
Article 1105: Fau and Equitable Treatment.
Article 11 10: Expropriation.
The arbitration pane agreed to hear the case.
The US argued that the arbitration panel lacked
jurisdiction because the Mississippi Court
judgments are not "measures adopted or
maintained by a Party" because they resolved a
dispute between private parties.
The arbitration panel rejected that argument and
held it had jurisdiction under NAFTA to proceed
with a hearing on the merits.
1102: National Treatment.
1105: Minimum Standard of Treatment.
1106: Performance Requirements.
1110: Expropriation.

The arbitration panel held that Canada violated the National
Treatment and minimum standards of treatment by
requiring Pope & Talbot to procure documents in Canada
rather than in the US.

Regional Priorities:
A Comparison o f Dispute Resolution Procedures under NAFTA
Chapter 11 and the North American Agreement o n Labor Cooperation

"Where I work there is only one fan for the entire department of sixty
workers. The environment is oppressive from bad ventilation; the air is full of
gas from arsenic and other chemicals whose names I don't know.. . The plants
don't have any windows. It's just walls on all sides so the lights and ventilation
is artifical. In the winter it gets dark very early so we enter and leave work in
darkness; we go for days without seeing the sun. .. One time they had to put me
on worker's compensation for four months because my body was completely
saturated with the chemicals [trichloroethylene, acetone, nickel, freon, and
others]. I breathed those acid vapors for many hours on end, often ventilation
was poor and I would get sick to my stomach. I received various detoxification
treatments at the Social Security Clinic (IMSS) and they told me I could no
longer work with chemicals. My stomach burned a great deal and I had constant
headaches. When 1 returned to the job, I was assigned to work in the chemical
room..."'
"lnternational Competition has forced many U S , companies to develop
the concept of production sharing to remain competitive with European and FarEast companies. When Mexico established the maquiladora program in 1965,
U.S. corporations began to realize the advantages of establishing operations in
Mexico, a country which offered lower production costs (including lower labor
and transportation costs), closer proximity to the United States, and the
availability of immediate technical assistance from parent companies, thereby
producing higher product quality."2

These contrasting narratives about the maquiladoras3 depict the two extreme
worlds created by the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA.~T h e first
describes the marginalized world o f the people who work in the maquiladoras; the second
I

Prieto, Norma Iglesias. The Beautiful Flowers of the Maquiladoras. University of Texas Press. (Austin
1997, pp., l l and 20)
2
"Frequently Asked Questions and Answers (FAQs) About Maquiladoras", Available l?om the Department
of Justice at: <hnp://www.mac.doc.gov/nafta~83
13.hhn>, last checked on 3/23/02.
Maquiladoras are manufacturing plants on the Mexican side of the US-Mexico border. The name comes
6 0 m the payment that millers received from farmers for grinding their corn into meal, and thereby adding
value. Maquiladoras operate in cities all along the US-Mexico border, and increasingly they are being set
up in Central Mexico. See, Devon G. Pena. The Terror ofthe Machine: Technology, Work, Gender and
Ecology on the US.-Mexico Border. 46-51 (1997). The laws that they operate under will be described
later in this paper.

'

describes the economic motivation, created by NAFTA, for US companies to finance
maquiladoras. Many factors have worked to produce this manufacturing industry or
zone. One factor is geographical: the US - Mexico border separates one of the most
dramatic disparities in wealth between two nations, and especially their citizens, in the
entire world.'

Another factor is historical: Mexican migrants have crossed the border to

find better paying jobs in the US for decades; now they are being forcefully kept on the
However, the focus of this
Mexican side of the border to work in US owned factorie~.~
paper will be the agreements made between the three countries governing investment in
one state by another, Chapter 11 of N A F T A ~and labor relations and rights, the North
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, or NAALC.' Comparing the way these two
parts of NAFTA were drafted and have been used shows that the drafters of NAFTA
listened to the investor's story more than the worker's story.
Through an examination these two components of NAFTA, and the claims filed
under both of them, this paper will argue that NAFTA was written with a bias in favor of
protecting the rights of investors and over protecting the rights of the workers of Mexico,
the US and Canada. Specifically, this paper focuses on the submissions or reports of
violations of Mexican federal labor law in the maquiladora zone submitted to the United
States National Administrative Offices (NAO) and the claims filed under Chapter 11 of

4

North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 296 [hereinafter
NAFTA].
While the GermanyPoland border has a more dramatic GDP differential (1 1:1) compared to the
USIMexico border (6: I), the length ofthe border and the wage differential for a potential worker between
the US and Mexico makes the differences all the more glaring. Stalker, Peter. Workers without Frontiers.
Lynne Rienner Publishers (Boulder 2000)
Elvia R. Arriola. Voices from the Barbed Wire of Despair: Women in the Maquiladoras, Latina Critical
Legal Theory, and Gender at the U.S.-Mexico Border. 49 DePaul L. Rev. 729, 738 (2000)
7
NAFTA, Chapter I I, supra note 4
8
Nonh American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 17, 1993, US.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1499
[hereinafter "NAALC"]

'

NAFTA. Chapter 11 of NAFTA governs investment in another State party to NAFTA,
and is a procedurally simple, binding and readily enforceable way for corporations to
protect their investments, even future investments. Conversely, lengthy deliberations,
subtle procedural handicaps, and the lack of efficient enforcement procedures
characterize the NAALC? Additionally, Chapter 11 has been used by investors obtain
money judgments in the millions of dollars from the governments of the US, Canada and
Mexico for enacting laws that lessen the profits of businesses investments, and thereby
effectively operating above the law of the country.1° The NAALC, however, only has the
power to require that a country enforce its current laws." Despite its structural
weaknesses, discussed in detail below, NAALC is a very important mechanism because it
was the first time that a trade agreement like NAFTA linked issues of trade to labor
rights.12 It has also been successfully used to help foster international labor solidarity by
creating a common forum for labor rights groups in one country to file a claim in support
of labor groups in other countries.''
The paper will begin with background on prior US -Mexico investment
programs, leading up to the passage of NAFTA. This will include a discussion of Fast
Track legislation and the political pressures that lead to the inclusion of the "side
agreements," NAALC and the North American Agreement on Environmental

Human Rights Watch. Trading Away Rights: The Unfulfilled Promise ofNAFTA's Labor Side
Agreement. April 2001, Vol. 13, No. 2 (B) [hereinafter "Human Rights Watch"].
10
Public Citizen. NAFTA Chapter 1 1 Investor-to-State Cases: Bankrupting Democracy. (September
200 I), available at: <www.citizen.org/release.cfm?ID=7076>[hereinafter "Public Citizen"].
' I NAALC, Article 1, supra note 8.
Rainer Dombois. Labor Regulation by the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation - a
problem of deficient design? Paper presented at the 54" Annual Meeting of the IIRA, January 36,2002 at
Atlanta. [on file with author][hereinafier "Dombois"].
" Lance A. Compa. The First NAFTA Labor Cases: A New International Labor Rights Regime Takes
Shape. 3 US.-Mex. L.J. 159, 159 (1995)

cooperation.14 Next, the paper will examine the most recent cases submitted under
NAALC regarding the maquiladora zone, and all Chapter 11 filings. Then, both dispute
resolution mechanisms will be evaluated and compared by asking two questions of each
dispute resolution process: who decides the dispute? And, what can an aggrieved person
expect to recover from filing a claim? These two questions highlight the benefits and
structural weaknesses of both dispute resolution mechanisms.

The Border Industrialization Program and Limitations on Investors
The US - Mexico Border Industrialization Program (BIP) began in 1965,just as
the Bracero programi5was ending. The BIP lowered import and export taxes along the
border, thus offering an economic incentive for US corporations to establish
maquiladoras. Mexico hoped that the maquiladoras would provide employment for the
guest workers returning to Mexico after filling the labor shortages in the US during the
Second World war.16 The maquiladoras were advertised as economically advantageous
for both the US and Mexico. The US corporations would benefits from the cheap labor
in Mexico, closer transportation costs and proximity to the US for oversight.'' Mexico
would get jobs and a jump-start in industrial manufacturing by the transfer of technology.
I4

North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation. Sept. 14, 1993. 32 I.L.M. 1480. Entered
into force January, 1 1994.
l5 The Bracero Program allowed "guest workers" from Mexico to work on farms in the US during labor
shortages during and after WWII. Engert, Michelle Phyliss. Working and Living Under Free Trade: the
People of the Maquiladoras on the Mexico-United States Border. Unpublished Thesis, University of Texas,
Austin. May, 2001
Ib
MacArthur, John R. The Setting of 'Free Trade ': NAFTA, Washington, and the Subversion of American
Democracy. Hill and Wang (New York 2000) [hereinafter "MacArthur"]

The maquiladora zone was also created to make Mexico more competitive with the cheap
production facilities in the Caribbean and the Far ~ a s t . "
Over the years, Mexico has slowly relaxed different investment laws to
accommodate US corporations. Just as Mexican President Porfirio Diaz did before the
turn of the 19Ihcentury, Mexico's political leaders have again began enticing foreign
investors with laws more favorable to investment. Generally, there are three kinds of
laws that govern foreign investment: governance by the home state (where the
corporation comes from), by the host state (where the investment is taking place) and by
. ' ~ nations have traditionally been reluctant to set any
multi-nation ~ r ~ a n i z a t i o n sHome
limits on corporate behavior that occurs outside of its jurisdiction. Similarly, multination1 organizations like the United Nations (UN) or the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) have largely failed to generate any international
or national laws that govern corporate behavior. They focus their efforts on the "creation
of guidelines for the conduct of multinational

enterprise^,"^^ and not on the promulgation

of international law.
That leaves the laws of the host country, Mexico in the case of the maquiladoras,
to control or govern the activities of multinational corporations in their territories.
During the BIP phase of Mexico's foreign investment period, Mexican law reflected a
bias in favor of local control. While the BIP lowered import and export tariffs on goods
brought in for assembly and exported back exclusively to the US, the actual control and

17

Nicole L. Grimm. The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation and Its Effects on Women
Working in Mexican Maquiladoras. 48 Am. U. L. Rev. 179, 182 (1998) [hereinafter "Grimm"].
Id.
l 9 Folsom, Ralph H., Gordon, Michael Wallace, and Spanoke, Jr., John A. International Business
Tran~acrions.West Publishing, 4Ih Ed. (St. Paul 1999) lhe~inafter'.~olsom"]
'O id. at 897, such as the Uh"s Code for Transnational Corporations

ownership of the maquiladoras were subject to joint venture requirements." A joint
venture requirement usually meant that at least 51% of the company had to be owned and
controlled by Mexicans. Mexico's 1973 Investment Law "both codified existing laws
and decrees and extended the scope of the joint venture."22 However, NAFTA changed
all that.

Negotiating NAFTA and NAALC
NAFTA was more of an investment agreement than a complete trade agreement.23
NAFTA is an example of a fourth type of governance, or a middle ground that countries
have created. It is not a multination organization like the UN or the OECD, but an
agreement by each member country to submit itself to NAFTA's jurisdiction and laws.
For the US, this was done quite unconventionally. Normally, an international agreement
of this type would be a Treaty, and subject to the Treaty provisions of the US
~ o n s t i t u t i o n However,
.~~
two things were done to remove NAFTA from the
Constitution's Treaty requirements.
First, then President George Bush received Fast Track Negotiation Authority from
~ o n ~ r e s s .This
~ ' enabled him, and the United States Trade Representative (USTR), to
negotiate the agreement in its entirety, with the House and Senate only voting for or
against the agreement. Normally, an agreement of this kind would be subject to the
"advice and consent" of the Senate, thereby enabling the Senate to change portions that it
21

Folsom, Ralph H., Gordon, Michael Wallace, and Lopez, David. NAFTA: A Problem-Oriented
Coursebook. West Publishing (St. Paul 2000) [hereinafter Folsom 111
22 Id. at 967
2' MacArthur, supra note 16 and Public Citizen, supra note 10
24

Id

This section is taken 6 o m both Frederick W. Mayer. Interpreting NAFTA. Columbia University Press
(New York 1998) [hereinafter "Mayer"] and MacArthur, supra note 5.

2'

did not like. Second, it was voted on as an executive agreement, or similarly to
legislation proposed by the Executive as implementing legislation. This required a
simple majority to pass, whereas a treaty needs a 213 majority.
Then candidate Clinton was pressured into taking a firm stance on whether or not
he would sign NAFTA.*~After heavy lobbying by pro-labor groups, environmentalists
and corporations, he said he was in favor of signing NAFTA, but only if it included side
agreements on labor and environmental protection.27 When Clinton was elected, he
directed his own team in the USTR to draft and negotiate these side agreements2*
Mexico and Canada reluctantly agreed to the addition of NAALC.'~ They agreed to its
addition to preserve NAFTA, and only when it was negotiated to not infringe on their
national sovereignty.30 It was assumed among the trade negotiators that the countries'
labor laws generally complied with international standards, and that monitoring by the
other countries party to NAFTA would suffice to ensure adequate compliance." Once
the NAALC was negotiated and included in NAFTA, Clinton signed NAFTA and
Congress voted it in by a narrow margin.32

NAALC: FOSTERING
INTERNATIONAL LABORSOLIDARITY
AND SMALL VICTORIES

Principles and Structure

26 Id

Chantell Taylor. NAFTA, GATT, and the Current Free Trade System: A Dangerous Double Standard
for Workers' Rights. 28 Denv. J. Int'l. L. & Pol'y 401 (2000).
Mayer, supra note 25
29 Dombois, 6 , supra note I2
id.
" Id
32
Mayer, supra note 25
27

''

The main body of NAFTA deals exclusively with trade and investment issues.33
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC)~~
was negotiated to be
a forum to resolve allegations of violations of a country's own labor laws. First, it is
important to note that NAALC does not create any supranational labor standards or a
body to enforce such standards. Each country is required to enforce its own labor laws,
and to "promote, to the maximum extent possible" eleven principles35:
Freedom of association and protection of the right to organize
The right to bargain collectively
The right to strike
Prohibition of forced labor
5. Labor protections for children and young persons
6 . Minimum employment standards
7. Elimination of e~ployrnentdiscrimination
8. Equal pay for women and men
9. Prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses
10. Compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses
1 1. Protection of migrant workers
1.
2.
3.
4.

These guiding principles mirror those set out in the UN International Convention on
Economic, Social and Cultural ~ i ~ h t and
s ? are
~ embodied in some form in laws of the
US, Mexico and Canada. Again, the idea was not to create new laws, but to increase the
enforcement of existing laws in each member country.
Each country is required to operate a National Administrative Office (NAO) to
receive complaints about a country not fulfilling its duties under NAALC.~' A private
right of action is provided for, meaning that any interested party can bring a claim before

'' Folsom 11, supra note 21
''NAALC, supra note 8
35

36

id. Art. 49

International Convention o f Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. U.N.G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16)49, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1967).
31
NAALC, Article 15, supra note 8. Keresztesi, Nicholas. Mexican Labour Laws and Practicies Come to
Canada: A Comment on the First Case Brought to Canada Under the North American Agreement on
Labour Cooperation. 18 C.L.E.L.J.41 1 (2000) [hereinafler "Keresztesi"]

the NAO.~' This could be the aggrieved worker, a Union in another member country, or
a Non-Govenunental Organization (NGO). Additionally, each NAO is directed to hear
claims arising out of another member country.39
The scope of issues that the NAALC allows to be brought is wide; however,
several of the eleven principles can advance beyond the first level of review.40 NAALC
provides for a three-tier review process, with the scope of issues heard narrowed at each
progressive tier.41 Once a claim is brought before a NAO, the office may refer the matter
to ministerial consultations if it determines the complaint raises meritorious issues.
However, NAALC does not give any guidelines on how the ministerial consultations
should proceed. The parties are only directed to "agree on the interpretation and
application of the Agreement, and shall make every attempt through cooperation and
consultations to resolve any matter that might affect its operationn4*and to provide the
other parties with any requested i n f ~ r m a t i o n . ~ ~
The next tier, an Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE), narrows the applicable
issues to those relating to "patterns of practice by each Party in the enforcement of its
occupational safety and health or other technical labor standards" and must be traderelated and "covered by mutually recognized labor ~aws.'"~Any party may request the
formation of an ECE, but it is subject not only to the above requirements, but also to

"NAALC, Article 4, supra note 8. Compa, Lance A. The First NAFTA Labor Cases: a New International
Labor Rights Regime Takes Shape. 3 U.S.-Mex. L.J. 159 (1995)
39 NAALC, Article 16, supra note I2
40
See Keresztesi, 4 17, supra note 37
dl
NAALC, Part Five, supra note 8
" NAALC, Art. 20, supra note 8
NAALC, Art. 22, supra note 8
NAALC, Art. 23, supra note 8

"

approval by the

The members of the ECE are chosen by the Council, which

also establishes the rules of procedure. There are three members and they are chosen for
their "expertise or experience in labor matters or other appropriate disciplines," and must
be independent of the NAALC and comply with "a code of conduct established by the

These committees can investigate the complaint by holding hearings, visiting the
location of the complaint, consider any information it deems relevant and publish their
findings:'

They cannot, however, require action to be taken on the part of one of the

Parties. The ECE's only enforcement power is to issue reports that condemn the situation
in the country where the violations occurred. Its report is sent to the Council for
evaluation and consideration. The Council is then directed to work cooperatively to
resolve the issue.48
Only an arbitration panel can force a member country to either enforce its own
labor laws by levying fines or removing trade benefits. However, the requirements for
forming an arbitration panel have not been met as of this

The issue must not

have been resolved 60 days after the Council convened, there must be a written request
from a consulting Party, and the Council must pass a two-thirds vote to form an arbitral
panel.50 Then, for the arbitral panel to hear the issue it must be a "persistent pattern of
failure by the Party complained against to effectively enforce its occupational safety and
health, child labor or minimum wage technical labor standards" and be trade-related and
45

NAALC, Art. 23 (1) and Art. 9: The Council is comprised of labor ministers from each o f the Parties. It
establishes its own rules and procedures, but must convene once a year for regular session and for a
"special session at the request of a Party," supra note 8
46 NAALC, Art. 24, supra note 8
NAALC, Art. 24 & 26, supra note 8
48
NAALC, Art. 27 & 28, supra note 8
49
NAALC, Art. 29, supra note 8; see <www.naalc.org> for the status ofsubmissions to the three NAOs.

"covered by mutually recognized labor ~aws."~'If the Arbitral Panel finds that an abuse
is ongoing, and the member nation refuses to take any action to remedy the situation, the
panel may fine52the country, or if it does not pay the fine, a suspension of NAFTA
benefits may be levied.53 This final enforcement provision, the only one with what could
be called "teeth," comes after long delays caused by NAALC's preference for
consultations and reports. Each stage has many days (60 to 120) between them that add
up, meaning that the complaining party could not see any enforcement for a terrible abuse
until three or more years after the initiation of the complaint.s4
Additionally, the arbitration proceedings themselves are undemocratic and biased
in favor of business and trade

interest^.^'

The panelists who sit on the arbitration panels

are drawn from a list of potential arbiters. These arbiters are usually trade and investment
lawyers.56 Since no NAALC claim has proceeded to arbitrati~n,~'
this discussion will be
picked up in the analysis of Chapter 11, where arbitration panels have been used
frequently.

Cases

This section analyzes all of the cases submitted under NAALC for labor rights
abuses along the US-Mexico border thus far. They demonstrate the positive and the

NAALC, Art. 29 (I), supra note 8
Art. 29 (I) (a) & (b), supra note 8
NAALC, Art. 39, supra note 8
53
NAALC, Art. 4 1, supra note 8. It should be noted that under Article 4, the offending party is always one
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benefited from the lax enforcement of laws will never be held responsible.
" Keresztesi, note 37
55
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For a summary of the submissions to all NAOs, see:
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negative aspects of the NAALC structure. Cases have been filed at every NAO, and for a
wide range of labor abuses.'* Most cases that the NAO decides are worthy of
investigation are referred to "ministerial consu~tations."~~
This process has helped foster
international labor solidarity by providing a common forum in the NAALC for labor
activists to air their grievances and communicate and work together. However, it has not
resulted in substantive relief for many of the abused workers. Institutionalized labor
abuses continue to happen on the border. Many times the abuses have been complained
of in a NAO submission. Without a strong enforcement mechanism to ensure that
reported and verified abuses stop, the NAALC will never completely realize its stated
goals.
The vast majority of the cases submitted for the maquiladora zone at the time of
. ~ ~ submission concerns gender based
writing concern freedom of a s s o ~ i a t i o n One
discrimination, and many later submissions contain violations of occupational health and
safety.6' The majority (16) were filed with the US NAO, five with the Mexican NAO
~ of the Canadian and all five Mexican
and three with the Canadian N A O . ~One

submissions dealt with labor abuses in the United States. Only the first submission went
farther than ministerial consu~tations.~~

" Id.

Id
Dombois, supra note 12
See, <http://www.naalc.org/englisWpublicationsummamain.htm, last visited April 3,2003
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National Labor Relations Board, 129 F.3d 1276,327 U.S.App.D.C. 164 (1997). The ministerial
consultations went ahead as scheduled and produced a reponon sudden
closings in each country,
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Submissions Regarding the Maquiladora Zone
1. Honewell & General Electric
The first US submissions accepted for review were submitted on February 14,
1994 by various labor unions to the US NAO.@ The International Brotherhood of
Teamsters (IBT) submitted No. 940001 and the United Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers of America (UE) submitted No. 940002. The complaints were merged because
they alleged the same violation. The submissions alleged that the right to freedom of
association in Mexico was being violated because they were not allowed to freely form
an independent union of their choice. The NAO accepted the cases for review on April
15, 1994.~'
The NAO held an information gathering hearing on September 1 2 , 1 9 9 4 . ~On
~
October 12, 1994, it determined that there was sufficient evidence that Mexico failed to
enforce its labor laws concerning freedom of association. Remarkably, in this first case
submitted to a NAO, where evidence was collected that Mexico was in violation of the
NAALC, the US NAO chose not to recommend ministerial consultations. It merely
recommended that the US, Canada and Mexico work together to develop a program to
address these issues.67

last visited, April 3,2003. See, Mexican Submission No. 9501 (SPRINT),available at:
<http://www.naalc.org/english~publications/summamexicohtm,
last visited April 3,2003
M
See, U.S. NAO, Public Report of Review,October 12, 1994, available at
<hnp://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/naoUBP94OOOl .htm>, last visited April 3, 2003
65 Id

The unions were outraged while the companies commended the N A O . ~This
~ first
case brought before the NAO highlights some of the uncertainties and structural
weaknesses of the NAO. First, it does not have subpoena power to compel witnesses to
testify.69 Therefore, both Honeywell and General Electric sent written statements
concerning their position that no Mexican laws were violated. This did not allow the
union lawyers or the NAO hearing officer to question the representatives of the
corporations about how much they knew about Mexican law or how much control the US
executives might have had over the maquiladora's day-to-day operation. Second, the
NAO does not provide an adversarial trial that arrives at any binding

conclusion^.^^

It is

merely a fact-finding or exploratory hearing that can make recommendations. Then, it is
up to the governments to follow those recommendations or not.
However, the NAO proceedings do provide a public forum for labor advocates
and aggrieved employees to make their case when no other forum is available.
Therefore, labor rights advocates should not be discouraged when the NAO does not take
any direct action, because it simply cannot.

2.

SONY
That same summer, on August 16, 1994 a group of labor rights organizations filed

Submission No. 940003 with the US NAO. The International Labor Rights Fund (ILRF)
headed the group. Again, this complaint alleged the inability of workers in a maquiladora
in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, this time owned by Sony Corp., to exercise their right to

Compa, Lance. NAFTA's Labour Side Agreement Five Years On: Progress and Prospects for the
NAALC. 7 C.L.E.L.J. 1 (1999) [hereinafter "Compa"]
Id.
' O Id.
68

freedom of association and the right to organize. After another information gathering
session in February of 1995, the NAO issued a report in April recommending ministerial
consultations concerning union registration in Mexico. The labor ministers of each
country met and held a series of programs designed to address these problems in each
country. They were concluded in 1996.
The US NAO issued a follow-up report in December 1996 on the status of the
Sony

worker^.^'

It noted that the situation on the ground had not changed, but there were

"potentially significant developments" taking place in Mexico with a decision of the
Mexican Supreme Court and other initiatives to change labor law that might provide
greater rights for independent unions.

3. SUTSP
The ministerial consultations resulting from the Sony submission did not change
the situation in Mexico and another submission was filed. The International Labor Rights
Fund (ILRF), Human Rights WatcWAmericas (HRW),and the Mexican Association of
Democratic Lawyers (Association de Nacional de Abogados Democraticos, or ANAD)
filed Submission No. 9601 on June 13, 1996.~'It alleged the continued lack of freedom
of association for federal workers, and went on to question the impartiality of the labor
tribunals to effectively review the cases and these issues.73
The Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores de la Secretaria de Pesca (SUTSP, or the
Mexican Fisheries Union) lost its representation rights when the Mexican Fisheries
71

See U.S.NAO, Submission No. 940003 Follow-Up Report, December 4, 1996, available at:
<http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao940003.htm>, last visited April 3, 2003
72 See, U.S. NAO, Submission No. 9601, available at:
<http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media~reports/nao/96Ol
.htm>, last visited April 3,2003

Ministry merged with a larger ministry of environment and natural resources."

The

submission alleged SUTSP lost its registration improperly at the merge because the other
ministry's union was more pro-go~ernment.'~The Mexican federal labor law that
prohibits more than one union per governmental entity was challenged as a violation of
the International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 87, which is part of the Federal
Law of ~ e x i c o It. ~also
~ alleged that the participation of other union in the hearing by
the Mexican Federal Labor Board, the Junta de Conciliation y Arbitraje (JCA, or the
Conciliation and Arbitration Board), was a conflict of interest and a violation of principle
of an impartial tribunal under the NAALC.~'
The Submission was accepted for review on July 29, 1996.7' A hearing was held
in Washington, DC in December 1996.'~ On January 27, 1997, a report was issued
calling for ministerial consultations. It recommended the ministers address issues of the
status of international treaties and constitutional provisions for the protection of freedom
of association. During the consultations the governments of Canada, the US, and Mexico
agreed to information publicly to facilitate a full examination of the issues.80
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Summers, Clyde. NAFTA's Labor Side Agreement and International Labor Standards. 3 J. Small &
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Human Rights Watch, the ILRF, and the ANAD filed Submission No. 9701 at the

US NAO on May 16, 1997." For the first time, a submission alleged wide spread gender
based discrimination in the entire Mexican maquiladora industry. The submission was
centered on allegations of pregnancy testing as a requirement for employment, and as a
requirement for continued employment. If a woman could not produce evidence that she
was menstruating, she would either not be hired in the first place, or would be fired from
her job, if she was already employed.82 The express purpose of this practice is to avoid
paying the maternity leave required under Mexican law.83 Most of the Mexican
maquiladora companies mentioned in the submission are subsidiaries of US

corporation^.^^ Additionally, the submission alleged a violation of the NAALC Article 4
requirement that victims of labor abuse have access to remedy in a competent tribunal.85
Mexican law only reviewed cases where employees were discriminated against, and since
women not hired because of pregnancy testing were never hired, they could not seek
redress under Mexican law.86
On July 14, 1997, the US NAO accepted the submission for review, and the
following November a public hearing was held in Brownsville,

exa as."

The three

Parties agreed to a Ministerial Consultations Implementation Agreement by which the
Parties agreed to coordinate a conference that was later entitled "Protecting the Labor

"

See, U.S. NAO, Public Report of Review ofNAO Submission No. 9701, available at

<http:llwww.dol.goviilablmedidreports/naolpubrep970l.htm~,
last visited April 3,2003
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Rights of Working Women", and was held in Merida, Yucatan, ~ e x i c o . ' ~
At first, the
Mexican Government insisted that while post-hire employment termination for reasons of
pregnancy was illegal, pre-hiring pregnancy testing and refusal to hire a pregnant woman
was perfectly legaLS9 During the course of the conference, the Mexican Government
reversed its position and stated that employment discrimination based on the pregnant
status of a woman was illegal, for either pre- or post-hiring

situation^?^

Pursuant to the

Agreement, the US and Canada have hosted two outreach sessions to teach female
workers their rights under the law: one in McAllen, Texas, and the other in Reynosa,
Tamaulipas, ~ e x i c o . ~ '
However, pregnancy testing is still allegedly practiced in the maquiladoras, and is
evidence of the Mexican Governments inability to effectively enforce its labor laws in the
maquiladora zone.92

5. Han Young

On October 30, 1997 the Support Committee for Maquiladora Workers (SCMW),
the ILRF, the ANAD and the Union of Metal, Steel, Iron, and Allied Workers (Sindicato
de Trabajadores de la Industria Metalica, Acero, Hierro, Conexos y Sirnilares -

STIHMACS) of Mexico filed Submission No. 9702 with the US NAO?' It concerned
freedom of association rights of workers at the Han Young maquiladora in Tijuana, Baja

''Id.
"Human Rights Watch, supra note 9
Id.

90
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id

Ableman, Aimee M. The Success o f Labour Side Agreements in Preventing Sex Discrimination in
Mexico and Latin America. Unpublished Thesis, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada (August
2001).
93
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last visited April 3,2003
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California, Mexico. Workers were intimidated and threatened by the company and some
were fired. The NAO recommended ministerial consultations to once again ensure that
worker's freedom of association rights were not being violated under Mexican law."
An amendment alleging occupational safety and health violations was submitted

on February 9, 1998 by the Maquiladora Health and Safety Support Network, Worksafe!
Southern California, the United Steelworkers of America (USWA), the United Auto
Workers (UAW) and the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW)?' The NAO also
recommended ministerial consultations on issues of worker health and safety.96
Both ministerial consultations yielded more binational public seminars on both
freedom of association and occupational safety and health

concern^.^'

Mexico has

promised to conduct seminars expressly dealing with the law and practice of its labor
boards, the JCA, to ensure their impartiality.98

6. EchlinIITAPSA

In one of the longest list of concerned organizations yet, the Echlin Workers
Alliance, an association of unions in the United States and Canada, filed US NAO
Submission No. 9703 on December 15, 1997.9~It is comprised of the Teamsters, the
UAW, the CAW, UNITE, the UE, the Paperworkers, and the Steelworkers. Twenty-four
additional organizations from all three NAFTA countries were listed as concerned
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U.S. NAO Submission No. 9703, available at:
<http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/PUBREP97O3.HTM,last checked April 3,2003
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organizations. Later, the AFL-CIO, the CLC (of Canada) and the UNT (of Mexico)
joined the submission.100
Again, the submission alleged freedom of association violations in a maquiladora,
this time in Central ~exico.lO'The Itapsa processing plant in Ciudad de 10s Reyes, in the
State of Mexico, was the site of reported harassment and intimidation. The abuses were
not only committed by the company and the existing union, the CTM, but also with the
~ ~ NAO confirmed that
knowledge and complicity of the Mexican ~ o v e r n m e n t . 'The
workers were threatened, both physically and mentally, and faced dismissal if they joined
the new union.'03 One the day of the vote to elect the new union, management brought in
hired thugs to intimidate the workers as they voted publicly.104As to the health and
safety violations, the submission alleged that the workers were exposed to asbestos and
other toxic chemica~s.'~~
This exposure was compounded because the company did not
provide the workers with personal protective equipment.lo6
The US NAO accepted the submission for review on January 30, 1998, and held a
public hearing in Washington, DC in March 1998.Io7 In July, the NAO issued its report
recommending ministerial consultations on freedom of association and health and safety
laws.'08 Almost a year later, on May 18,2000, Mexican Secretary of Labor and Social
Welfare Mariano Palacios and US Labor Secretary Alexis M. Herman signed a
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104

ministerial agreement.lo9 Mexico will endeavor to make sure Mexican workers are
provided with information concerning their right to collective bargaining agreements and
to promote the use of voter lists and secret ballots to determine disputes over the election
of new unions. However, there is no time frame or a detailed discussion of how Mexico
will achieve these goals.110
Mexico has held seminars in Tijuana, Baja California, Mexico about the right to
freedom of ass~ciation."~Also, Mexico has once again agreed to hold seminars
regarding its labor review boards, JCAs, to ensure their impartiality."2

7. TAESA

This Submission involved allegations that a private Mexican airline company,
Executive Air Transport, Inc. (TAESA), violated the rights to freedom of association,
minimum employment standards, and occupational safety and health regulations. The
Association of Flight Attendants (AFA) and the Association of Flight Attendants of
Mexico (ASSA) filed Submission No. 9901 on November 10, 1999.Il3
The submission alleges that the flight attendants union election system violated
the freedom of association laws because workers who supported organizing a new union
were terminated.'I4 Furthermore, the Mexican government did not enforce compliance
with minimum labor standards, specifically the payment of overtime and mandatory
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.htm>, last visited April 3, 2003
]I4

1d

contributions to social security, pensions and housing.'15 Occupational safety standards
were alleged violated because of inadequate safety training, unsafe flight conditions, and
flight attendants were forced to work over the maximum number of hours in flight.'16
The US NAO accepted the submission for review on January 7,2000, and a
hearing was held in March of 2000 in Washington, DC."' The NAO issued its public
report on July 7, 2000, recommending ministerial

consultation^."^

The US Secretary of

Labor requested ministerial consultations with his Mexican counterpart, who accepted on
July 24,2001."~

8. Auto TridCustom Trim
The Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras filed Submission No. 2000-01 on
July 3 , 2 0 0 0 . ' ~The
~ allegations include occupational safety and health and compensation
in two maquiladoras.'2' The first is the Auto Trim of Mexico in Matamoros, Tarnaulipas,
Mexico, and the second is the Custom TrimlSreed Mexicana at Valle Hermoso,
Tamaulipas, ~ e x i c 0 . lBoth
~ ~ plants sew leather covers on steering wheels and gearshifts.
The US NAO accepted the submission for review on September 12,2000, and a public
~ NAO report
hearing was held in San Antonio, Texas, on December 1 2 , 2 0 0 0 . ' ~The

Id.
Id.
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recommended ministerial consultations. On July 24,2001 the Mexican Secretary of
Labor formally agreed to the consultations offered by the US Secretary of ~ a b 0 r . I ~ ~

9. Duro Bag

The AFL-CIO and PACE filed Submission No. 2001-01 to complain about a
union representation election at a Duro Bag maquiladora in Rio Bravo, Tamaulipas,
~ e x i c 0 . lThe
~ ~complaint alleged that the company violated the freedom of association
laws by not permitting a secret ballot in a location the workers felt was free from
managerial inf1~ence.l~~
The US NAO stated that consideration of this complaint would
not further the objectives of the NAALC and declined to accept the submission for
review on February 22,2002.'~'

Conclusion
The cases submitted under NAALC concerning labor rights abuses in the
maquiladora zone highlight its strengths and weaknesses. It is important to remember
that NAALC was the first time that labor rights were incorporated into a trade
agreement.'28 The cases have accomplished fostering international labor solidarity by
providing a common forum to funnel their complaints,'29but they have not resulted in a
change in the underlying causes of the disputes, namely the non-enforcement of the
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Mexican labor laws.'30 If the situation does not change, there will be an ever increasing
list of "ministerial consultations" recommended by the NAOs. Additionally, a fatigue
over filing submissions generated by the relative ineffectiveness of NAALC could lead to
a drop-off of submi~sions.l~~
In order to achieve the goals stated in the Preamble and Objectives of NAALC,'~*
it must have a stronger mandate and enforcement capability. The cases filed thus far
show that freedom of association is violated throughout the maquiladora zone. The nine
submissions to the US NAO concerning the maquiladora zone have all listed freedom of
association violations. However, since the NAALC does not have the power to issue and
does not allow for the cross-examination of witnesses, there is no way for the
complaining party to fully investigate the alleged vi01ations.l~~
The NAOs have defined
their role in the proceedings as limited to information gathering and providing forums for
cooperation among the member states.'34 While this function is an important step in
transnational labor protection, it does not go far enough to protect the labor rights of the
working people in the maquiladora zone because the abuses continue.13'
Anther structural criticism of the NAALC system is that is lacks an independent
oversight body.'36 There is no independent body that can call for further investigations or
pursue sanctions against a Party. The NAOs are not separate from the political structure
of each country. The Parties ensured that a political solution would always be available
to labor abuse problems. Once a claim moves to ministerial consultations, it is removed
130
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to the political arena. It then takes political will on the part of the government to pursue
the claim. At the present moment, there are many other pressing political issues that the
governments deal with, including, but not limited to: immigration, drug trafficking,
promotion of trade, combating white-collar crime and combating t e r r 0 r i ~ m . l ~ ~
Secondly, the undefined manner in which the "ministerial consultations" proceed
allows the Parties to avoid effectively dealing with a complaint by having a ministerial
con~ultation."~By not defining what should come out of a ministerial consultation, the
parties are free to declare that they complied with procedure and due process when they
have not done anything to remedy the problem. If the governments themselves have a
vested interest in allowing the abuse to continue, like keeping labor costs down, they can
avoid taking substantive action to prevent the abuse from happening again.139
Additionally, the inability to bring certain claims to the ECE and the arbitral
panels handicaps the process.'40 Rights such as the promotion of high labor standards,
providing access to fair labor tribunals and the rights associated with freely forming
unions are essential and basic rights to ensure advocacy of labor rights, yet these cannot
be brought to ECEs or arbitral panels.'4' The abuse of freedom of association rights has
been cited in all of the submission thus far, however, this abuse can only be dealt with
through ministerial

consultation^.'^^

Even in the face of nine submissions repeatedly

accusing the Mexican government of failing to observe its own laws allowing for
freedom of association, the NAALC can do nothing more than recommend ministerial
consultations. The rights of freedom of association and to freely choose an independent
I3'1d, 2
Id., 21
139
Id., 21, see also, Grimm, supra note 17
140
Keresztesi, 430, supra note 37

union are important because independent unions work to protect other rights, such as
minimum wage pay, occupational health and safety, and child labor protections.'43
However, only these more individualized rights concerning child labor, minimum
employment standards, occupational injuries and illnesses can advance to the level where
a group outside the government's control would review the case.'44 Several authors have
noted that associational rights were granted the weakest protection under N A A L C . ' ~ ~
The ITAPSA case demonstrates this problem.'46 Although the submission alleged
health and safety violations, along with freedom of association claims, it did not move
past ministerial consu~tations.'~'The health and safety violations were no doubt severe,
but the more striking violation was the freedom of association and freedom to choose an
independent union. Not only were the workers physically harassed by the state run union
when they attempted to organize an independent union, but the Mexican Junta de
Conciliacion y Arbitraje's neutrality was questioned because its panel was made up of
representatives from the state union, the state itself and the business owner.'48 In effect,
the workers were faced with appealing their grievance under Mexican law to a panel
stacked against them.'49 However, the NAOs can only hold ministerial consultations on
the freedom of association claims. Moreover, the claims of occupational safety and
health were not advanced beyond ministerial consultations even though there have been
14'
14'
143
I44

NAALC, Art. 29, Art. 38, supra note 8
Keresztesi, 430, supra note 37
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nine submissions alleging occupational safety and health violations in the maquiladora
zone.150
Time delays are also a concern with the current structure of the NAALC."'
There is no time specified for ministerial consultations to reach an outcome.'s2 Instead, it
is left up to the countries to decide how long they will pursue ministerial consultations.
Additionally, when the submission is finally accepted by the NAO, ministerial
consultations can only gather information through public forums and hold informational
seminars. Ministerial consultations cannot compel a Party to change or enforce its labor
laws. Tri-national seminars on the continued abuse of freedom of association rights in
Mexico are obviously not preventing recurring

violation^.'^^

Finally, although there is a private right of action to submit a claim to an NAO,"~
there is no private right of appeal. If an NAO decides not to consider some of the facts
alleged in a submission, or decides to only take a case to ministerial consultations, there
is no procedure for a party to appeal the NAO's decision.155There have been five
submissions alleging a failure of Mexico to enforce its occupational safety and health
laws.156Yet, there has been no action towards forming an ECE by the U.S. ~
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The sad reality is that Mexico is not enforcing its laws in the maqiladora zone.'58
There are possibly two reasons why, among many. One is the cultural and governmental
acceptance of these norms. The other is the fact that if Mexico enforces its laws and
drives up the price of producing goods in Mexico, then the Multi-National Corporations
(MNCs) might locate their business e~sewhere.'~~
By raising the cost of doing business
in Mexico, it might destroy its comparative advantage of cheap labor.
Perhaps even more insidious is the fact that Mexico and the US corporations can
hide behind the fa~adeof the NAALC procedures. If this is the only official means to
police labor violations along the US-Mexico border, and if the NAALC does what it is
required to do, then Mexico and the corporations can say they are complying with the
law. Since there are no references to increased inspections or compliance procedures
initiated by the Mexican government, the NAALC is not fulfilling a role as the solution to
labor abuses in the maquiladora zone.
However, sanctions might not be the only answer. The effective enforcement of
laws requires funds sufficient to do so. Ideally, a development fund under NAFTA
would be created to help Mexico improve its administration of labor law.

Ywg, U.S. NAO Submission No. 9702, available at:
<hnp://www.dol.govlilablmedidreports/nao/pubrep9702.h,last visited April 3,2003; Auto Trim, US
NAO Submission No. 2000-0 1, available at: < hnp://www.dol.gov/ilab/media~reports/nao/pubrep2000I.hhn>, last visited April 3, 2003;
US NAO Submission No. 9901, available at:
<hnp:llwww.dol.govlilab/medidreponslnao/pubrep99Ol
.htm>, last visited April 3, 2003; DuroBae.
US
NAO Submission No. 2001-01, available at:
<http:/lwww.dol.govlilab/media~report~/naoIsubmi~sion~/duro~ubmis~ion.htm>
last visited April 3,2003
'51 See U.S. NAO Status of Submissions web-page: ~http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/nao/sts.htm~,
last visited April 3, 2003
Human Rights Watch, supra note 9
Is9 Tiano, Susan. Patriarchy on the Line: Labor, Gender, andldeology in the Mexican Maquila Industry.
Temple University Press (Philadelphia 1994)

m,

CHAPTER
11: PUBLIC
HEALTHAND SAFETY
REGULATIONS
BECOME
ILLEGAL

Principles and Structure

NAFTA Chapter 11 goes to the heart of NAFTA. Investment is the crux of the
agreement: Mexico needed foreign investment, and US investors wanted more assurances
of stability in ~ e x i c o . ' ~Chapter
'
11 is divided into two parts. The first part, Section A,
deals with what treatment a country should give investors from another party.16' The
second part, Section B, is concerned with appropriate remedies if an investment is not
treated as it should be under the first part.162 In this sense Chapter 11 is an attempt to
address the deficiencies of international law in dealing with foreign direct i n ~ e s t m e n t . ' ~ ~
Chapter 11's Dispute Resolution section is unique because the investors, or
private parties, can sue the government directly if they feel their investment has been
P

expropriated or infringed upon by a governmental "meas~re."'~~
This means that the
federal governments of Canada, Mexico and the US are the entities that the corporations
will sue. Even when the allegedly investment infringing law is promulgated by a local or
state entity the federal government is still responsible. The federal governments will
have to defend laws promulgated by local governments because Chapter 11 defines a
government "measwe" as something that could possibly infringe on an investor's rights,
such as "any law, regulation, procedure, requirement or practice."'65 What constitutes an
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16' NAFTA, Chapter I I, Section B,supra note 4
la Folsorn 11, supra note 21
Iffl NAFTA, Art. 1 1 16 & 1 1 17,supra note 4
165
NAFTA, Art. 201, supra note 4
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"investor" is defined in NAFTA Article 1139: 166 an enterprise, an equity security of an
enterprise, a debt security of an enterprise, a loan to an enterprise, an interest in an
enterprise that entitles the owner to income or profits, real estate or other property used
for business purposes, and certain interest arising from the commitment of capital.
Of the many new rights given to investors under NAFTA Chapter 11, the five
primary rights or privileges investors have invoked most often in Chapter 11 Arbitration
are: 167
1. Article 1110: Direct Government Expropriation, which includes a government

act that is tantamount to nationalization, or expropriation. The exception is if
the expropriation is "(a) public purposes; (b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105 (1); and (d) on
payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6 . ..3,168

2. Article 1102: National Treatment. All States Parties to NAFTA must treat
foreign investors the same as they do national investors.
3. Article 1103: Most Favored Nation Treatment. Each State Party to NAFTA

must give an investor from another signatory Party the same treatment as it
gives to any other investor from another nation, this may be better treatment
than the Party gives to its own investors.
4. Article 1105: Minimum Standard of Treatment. This provision incorporates

international law, "including fair and equitable treatment and full protection

defined as a private or publicly held legal entity, including any corporation, bust, partnership, sole
roprietorship,joint venture, or other association, NAFTA, Article 201, supra note 4.
P67 Public Citizen, supra note 10
16' NAFTA Art. 1 1 10, supra note 4

and security."'69 Investors have used this vague provision to expand the
NAFTA's investment protections.170
5. Article 1106: No Performance Requirements. This article explicitly prohibits

rules that seek to protect local markets. These measures include domestic
content and environmental conduct.
When a corporation believes that a member country has violated one of the above
rights, it can file a claim with an international arbitration panels for binding arbitration
and money damages.I7' It authorizes the World Bank's International Center for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).'~~
Both were created to hear private
international commercial disputes.173Once a request for a hearing has been filed, the
parties appoint the members of the trib~na1.I~~
Under both systems, the hearings are not
open to the

although the documents and memoranda filed in each dispute are

generally made available to the
The most important laws governing foreign investment are those of the host
country, and now of N A F T A . ' ~NAFTA
~
establishes "common laws in some areas, and
seeks to extend that harmonization to nearly all foreign investment, with minimum

NAFTA, Art. 1105, supra note 4
Public Citizen, supra note 10
17' NAFTA, Art. 1120, supra note 4
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'77 Folsom, supra note 19
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exceptions."178While each of the Parties' laws are different, there is a common thrust to
the laws of Canada and Mexico: they are both concemed with the dominance of US
investment in their countries. The US is seen as the major exporter of foreign
investment, and Canada and Mexico are concemed about the negative effects of
unchecked foreign inve~tment."~
Canada has a history of restricting investment in particular areas like financial
institutions, natural resources, transportation, and publishing.180Canada was open to
foreign investment until the 1960s, when nationalistic fervor prompted restrictions.
Recently, however, the Investment Canada ~ c t " '(ICA) was modified first by the
Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, and then by NAFTA. Canada did, however,
negotiate an exemption for its "cultural" industries.lS2
Mexico has a long and turbulent history with foreign investment. When political
power was consolidated in Mexiw for the first time since independence, the politicos
looked to the United States for investment.ls3 Porfirio Diaz ruled Mexiw with a complex
mix of political payoffs, military control of civilian life, and liberalism before it was
"neo." The Porfiriato, so called because Diaz ruled the country for more than forty years
with the same economic advisors called cientificos, opened the country up to foreign
investment in railroads, banking, oil exploration, mining, and large-scale agriculture. By
Id.
Negative aspects of foreign investment are: repatriation of profits, lack of local control over company
direction, extraction of natural resources without sufficient compensation, adverse effects on the nation's
balance of payments, few managerial jobs for locals and/or the best jobs to foreigners, and for Canada
especially, the loss of control over "cultural" industries like television, radio and publishing. Folsom 11,
supra note 21
180
Folsom 11, supra note 2 1
181
R.S. 1985, ch. 28 (Is' Suppl.), as amendedby I988 ch. 65 and Investment Canada Regulations SOR18561 1, as amended by SOR189-69
181
Folsom 11,289, supra note 21
Hart, John Mason. Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming andProcess ofthe Mexican Revolution.
University of California Press (Berkeley 1997)

the time of the Mexican Revolution of 1910, a small group of Mexican elite and
foreigners controlled the vast majority of the country's wealth. It is debatable if the
Revolution was truly intended to reverse the situation, or to simply spread the wealth
around to a few more Mexicans, and a few less foreigners. Regardless, it was not until
President Cardenas used Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution to nationalized Mexican
oil and later telecommunications industry that the stated goals of the Mexican Revolution
began to be felt by the populace.
This history is important because it informs the discussion of modem Mexican
politics surrounding foreign investment. The day that President Cardenas nationalized
oil, and created PEMEX as the Mexican oil company, is now a national holiday, "el dia

de la nationalization depetrolio," on March 18'. PEMEX is considered a national
treasure and patrimony. The negotiations that led up to NAFTA were politically very
difficult because the prospect of opening up PEMEX to foreign investment is tantamount
to China buying the Statute of ~ i b e r t ~ .Mexico
"~
has been on a slow road back to
encouraging foreign investment since the 1940s. The Law to Promote Mexican
Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment of 1973Is5attempted to create a more
organized system for foreign investment, but retained a joint-venture requirement of 51%
minimum Mexican ownership.'86 After back and forth relaxation and tightening of the
law over the next twenty years, the 1993 Investment

was a major change and a

necessary step in Mexico's attempt to join NAFTA."~ While the act was decidedly proinvestment, it did retain restrictions over natural resources, a reservation of some
184

Mayer, supra note 25
Diario Oficial, March 9, 1973
Folsom, supra note 19
la' Diario Oficial, December27, 1993

investment areas to Mexican nationals, and it did not abolish the Calvo

lau use.'^^

This

was a monumental achievement for the Mexican political leaders, one that turned the
clock back almost 110 years to when Porfirio Diaz's regime started opening Mexico up to
foreign investors.
The United States does not have any regulations on foreign investment, per se, but
has several restrictions with rationales based on other concerns. The most widely known
and most complained about is the Exon-Florio amendment provisions.'90 It enables the
president to halt or reverse investment if it raising concerns of "national
Investors complain that national security is not defined anywhere in the act, and that it
has been used as a cover to restrict investment for political reasons. However, it is not
used very often, and does not serve as a block to everyday i n ~ e s t m e n t . 'Additionally,
~~
the US requires a maximum 25% foreign investment equity in airlines, and has many
restrictions on the ownership of facilities that deal with or produce nuclear materials.

Cases

The cases filed and decided under Chapter 11 stand in marked contrast to those
discussed under the NAALC. The cases move swiftly to arbitration, decisions were
issued rapidly and the corporations were compensated for the harm to their investment in
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full. Moreover, the companies were compensated for losses that they could not have
recovered under the national laws of each party to NAFTA.

1. Ethel v. Canada
In April of 1997 Ethyl Corporation filed a NAFTA Chapter 11 claim against the
Canadian government for $251 million in damages with UNCITRAL rules of
arbitration.I9' Ethyl manufactured methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl
(MMT) in the US and imported it to Canada to be refined.lg4 The adverse health effects
of inhaling or ingesting manganese have been known since the 1800s, however, the full
effects of putting these chemicals in gasoline were not know at the time.I9' Canada took
a precautionary measure by banning the importation and inter-provincial transport of
MMT. This effectively banned MMT because it was not produced in ~ a n a d a . ' ~ ~
Ethyl had threatened the Canadian parliament with the Chapter 11 suit when it
debated the proposed ban 1996.19' Ethyl made good on its threats by suing under
NAFTA Article 1110, claiming that the ban on MMT was an "expropriation" of its
assets.'98 It also sued under Article 1102 rules for national treatment because the ban was
on imports, not domestic production, thus favoring any local producers of MMT and
hurting importers. Finally, Ethyl sued under Article 1106, stating that the ban was a local
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'"

performance requirement because it forced Ethyl to establish a plant in every Canadian
province.
Canada made initial arguments to the UNCITRAL panel claiming the ban on
MMT was not a "measure" under NAFTA and that Ethyl failed to wait the requisite six
months after the ban was passed to make a ~ 1 a i m . IThe
~ ~ Arbitral panel rejected
Canada's arguments that the law was not a "measure" under Chapter 11 on June 24,
1998.~" On July 20, 1998, the Canadian government reversed the law banning MMT
and paid Ethyl Corporation $13 million in legal fees and damages.201It issued a
statement that "'current scientific information' did not demonstrate MMT's toxicity or
that MMT impairs hnctioning of automotive diagnostic systems."202This was prepared
for Ethyl to use in advertising. A year and three months after Ethyl filed its suit against
Canada, it received compensation and a statement that its product was safe.
While the complete decision behind the settlement will not be known, it is
obvious that the Canadian government felt that the arbitral panel would rule against them,
and if they wanted to keep the law they would have to pay Ethyl damages. In this first
case challenging a governmental public health and safety regulation with the Chapter 11
investor-to-state provision, it is striking that Canada would have had to pay Ethyl
compensation under Chapter 11 even if the law was for a public purpose. Article 1110
states that even if a measure is for a public purpose, like stopping its citizens from
inhaling a known disabling neurological agent that causes symptoms similar to
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elapsed since the events giving rise to a claim, a disputing investor may submit the claim to arbitration."
*" Award on Jurisdiction in the NAFTANNCITRAL Case between Ethyl Corporation and the
Government of Canada, Jun. 24, 1998.
Public Citizen, 9, supra note 10

"'

=02

~ d .9,

Parkinson's disease:')

compensation must be paid in accordance with Article 1110 (2)

through (6). Therefore, this first case showed that a corporation's right to profits were
greater than the public's right to a clean environment. If the public wants a clean
environment, then they must pay the corporation for lost future profits. This is entirely
undemocratic, allowing corporations to be above the law. Chapter 11 is adding a
spending clause to every environmental health bill that is passed by the governments of
the NAFTA signatory countries: that they must pay for any lost profits.

2. Metalclad v. the Municipality of Guadalcazar, Mexico
On January 2, 1997, Metalclad sued the government of Mexico for $90 million
with the ICSID. It claimed that actions by the municipality of Guadalcazar were
tantamount to an expropriation without compensation under Article 1110 and that
Mexico had failed to provide fair and equitable treatment under Article 1105. Metalclad
had a long and turbulent history with the municipality of Guadalcazar, and the toxic
waste facility it bought and operated.*04
The facility is located on soils that are very unstable, with a complex hydrology
that includes active sinkholes and subterranean streams. The community of about 800
people that live within 10 kilometers of the site?O5 and had long resisted its expansion.
At first, a Mexican company, Coterin, wanted to expand the facility. It was denied.
Then, in 1993, Metalclad purchased the site, applied for an expansion permit, and was
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Metalclad Corp. vs. the United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, available at
<www.worldbank.orgiicsid~cases/awards.htm,
last checked March 30,2002
20'

denied, as

Metalclad then went to the Federal government and the state

government and reportedly received a permit to construct the additional facilities.207The
local government, however, continued to protest the expansion of the facility. This
included demonstrations and the active involvement of international environmental
organizations. The corporation alleged that it was prevented from operating the site
because of bureaucratic confusion on the part of the Mexican government, and that the
Mexican government assisted the demonstrators in blocking entrance to the site?''
Metalclad claims that they received permission from the Governor of San Luis
Potosi to go ahead with the constru~tion?~~
However, the Governor ordered state
troopers to block the entrance to the facility because he said it would contaminate the
groundwater. He based this assertion on an ecological study done by the University of
San Luis Potosi that conflicted with the one done by the federal government and
Metalclad. The governor subsequently declared the area a protected ecological zone?''
The arbitration panel reached its decision to award Metalclad $16.7 million on
August 30,2000. It held that 1) the municipality was wrong to require a local permit (it
interpreted Mexican law when the Mexican authorities said it was otherwise); 2) a
violation of Article 1105 took place; and 3) an expropriation under Article 1110 took
place.2" Mexico challenged the panel's ruling. This was the first time of an appeal from

Metalclad installed insulation and disposed of asbestos products along the West Coast of the US, Id,
Metalclad Corp, vs. the United Mexican States, ICSlD Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, available at
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a NAFTA governed decision.212It filed in a British Columbia court because under
ICSID rules the local rules of the place of arbitration govern.213The British Columbia
court held, in a split decision, that the date of the violations was wrong because the
arbitration panel confused dates as the time of expropriation. This lowered the total to
$15.6 million because of a reduction in interest.214On June 13,2001, Metalclad
announced that Mexico decided to pay the full amount.21s
There were many disheartening aspects of the panel's decision for publicly
minded government actors. The panel interpreted the meaning and applied its own
interpretation of local environmental laws. This should have been decided in domestic
courts. It also claimed that it "need not consider the motivation or intent for the adoption
of the Ecological Decree", thereby totally ignoring the public policy behind the law and
' ~ article allows
any consideration under Article 1114: "Environmental ~ o n c e r n s " . ~This
for a party to have discretion when making environmental laws and that it is
inappropriate to lower environmental laws to encourage investment. Authors have noted
that by interpreting Chapter 11 under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the
panel should have looked to the intent of the

drafter^.^"

Here, the intent of the NAFTA

drafters was most likely to prevent an expropriation without immediate and full
compensation, like Mexican oil in the 1930s and other events in the developing world. It
was not to pay for creeping expropriation by governmental regulation of public health

Portion of $16.7 Million Metalclad Award Set Aside. 16 No. 5 Mealey's Int'l Arb. Rep. 7 (May 2001)
Id,
214 Id,
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212
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matter^.^"

The arbitral panel's decision compensated a corporation's business mistakes

from only listening to one governmental entity when another is telling it the

3. S.D. Myers v. Mexico
S.D. Myers sought to import polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) from Canada into
the US for treatment and disposal. PCBs were widely used as coolants and for
lubrication in electrical equipment for many years.220However, the US EPA determined
that PCBs were toxic to humans and the environment. In 1977, the EPA banned their
production. Because PCBs are so dangerous, the international community acted, as well.
The Base1 conventionz2' strongly encourages countries not to export hazardous or toxic
materials, and instead to develop ways to dispose of the material domestically. Canada
stated it needed to review its policy regarding exports of PCBs to make s u e it complied
with these guidelines.222
S.D. Myers sought an export permit from Canada during the 1 9 9 0 s . ~Canada's
~~
1990 PCB Waste Export regulations allowed export of PCBs to the US if the US EPA
agreed. In 1995 the EPA granted S.D. Myers an import permit. One month after the US
opened up the border to imports of PCBs, Canada issued an Interim Order banning
exports of PCBs. During that one month period, S.D. Myers imported seven shipments
of Canadian PCBs. Sixteen months later a US Federal judge issued a ruling stopping all

Id.
Public Citizen, supra note 4
220 Id,
221 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal
Adopted by the Conference of the Plenipotentiaries on Mar. 22, 1989
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strategy to dispose of such waste at home." From Public Citizen, 15, supra note 10
218
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importation of PCBs into the US because it was a violation of the Toxic Substance
Control ~ c t . ~ ~
S.D. Myers then sued Canada for $20 million as compensation for lost profits
during the sixteen-month period when the US still allowed the importation of PCBs and
Canada did not allow their export.225The corporation argued that the Interim Order
violated 1) Article 1102: "National Treatment" because it was disguised discrimination
aimed at S.D. Myers; 2) Article 1105: "Minimum Standards of Treatment" because
Canada banned PCBs in a discriminatory and unfair manner; 3) Article 1106:
"Performance Requirements" because the ban required the corporation to dispose of the
PCBs in Canada; and, 4) the company argued that the ban was an expropriation of the
profits it could have earned during the sixteen months?26
On November 13,2000, the UNCITRAL tribunal dismissed S.D. Myers'
arguments regarding expropriation and performance, but upheld the other claims?27 The
panel ruled that S.D. Myers' share of the Canadian PCB market was an "investment"
under NAFTA, and Canada's ban was in violation of the national treatment provision and
the minimum standards provision. Therefore, Canada should compensate S.D. Myers for
its lost potential profits. However, at the time of this writing, the panel has not come up
with a compensation award.228
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This case widens the definition of "investment" and "investor" to a new girth.

S.D. Myers did not own any property affected in ~anada.'~'It did not employ any
permanent employees in Canada. It is not clear what S.D. Myers' investment in Canada
was. It was in the business of importing PCBs into the US. It knew it had problems
doing so in the past, and had no standing contract that was breached because of the
regulations. All it could show was that it might have imported more PCBs into the US
and then it might have made a profit.
This decision was rendered because Canada made swe it was not in violation of
other international treaty obligations.230This case illustrates that no other facts or
obligations will control in a Chapter 11 constituted arbitration panel other than the rights
of "investors" to their potential profits. It opens the floodgates for investors to claim a
loss of potential profits even when the regulations or measwes do not have a direct effect
on property or presently engaged contracts.
Additionally, this tribunal engaged in deciding the best way for Canada to
implement its policy

objective^.^^' It suggested that Canada should have offered

incentives to dispose of the PCBs in Canada. The language used was similar to the
World Trade Organization's "least trade restrictive" means possible.232 This was a panel
made up of trade lawyers and trade economists. They are not trained in environmental
matters and are not accountable to the people of Canada. Yet, they decided how Canada
should protect the health and well being of its citizens.
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4. Loewen v. Mississi~viJury
,n

In this case a Canadian-based corporation sued under Chapter 11 to recoup the
costs it lost in a jury trial in Mississippi. The Loewen Group had aggressively taken over
more than 1,100 funeral homes in different areas of both the US and ~ a n a d a . 2When
~ ~ it
expanded into Southern Mississippi, a private funeral home owner, Jeremiah O'Keefe of
Biloxi sued Loewen in state court alleging "various, unlawful, anti-competitive and
predatory acts designed to drive O'Keefe's local funeral home and insurance companies
out of business in violation of state

The jury sided with O'Keefe, and came back

with a verdict of $260 million?3s The Loewen Group could accept this judgment, or ask
the jury to reconsider its award in a separate penalty phase according to Mississippi law.
The Loewen Group sent the jury back, and they returned with a judgment of $500 million
for Mr. 0 ' ~ e e f e . ' ~
Loewen
~
decided to appeal the decision, and asked to be exempt from
a rule of state civil procedure. In order to appeal a verdict without first paying the
plaintiff, the losing party must buy a bond. The bond is usually worth 125% of the
judgment. Typically, the party purchases 10% of the bond and pledges the rest in
property as collateral.237The Mississippi Supreme Court denied Loewen's request to be
exempt from the bond. At this point, Loewen settled with O'Keefe for $150 million?38
However, the litigation did not stop there. Loewen filed a claim against the US
under the ICSID in accordance with Chapter 11 on October 30, 1998. Although Loewen
settled in Mississippi state court for $1 50 million, it demanded $725 million in damages
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from the US in its Chapter 11 claim?39 Loewen claimed the Mississippi judge allowed
the plaintiffs to appeal to "anti-Canadian, racial and class biases," of the jury during the
trail, resulting in the jury's large verdict for the plaintiff:40 and that this violated the
national treatment provisions of Article 1102. Article 1105: "fair and equitable
treatment" provision was violated because the bond requirement effectively forced
Loewen to settle the case. Finally, Loewen argued that "the excessive verdict, denial of
appeal, and coerced settlement were tantamount to an uncompensated expropriation in
violation of Article 1 1 10 of NAFTA."'~'
This marks the first time that a jury verdict was challenged under Chapter 11.
The US argued that a jury verdict, especially a private contractual dispute, cannot be
recognized as governmental measure, and NAFTA jurisdiction should be denied?42 The
arbitral panel formed to hear this case, however, found jurisdiction and did not place any
restrictions on the types of court actions it can review for NAFTA vio~ations?~~
The case is still pending, and its ruling will be one of the most important yet. In
the ever increasing scope of "investment", "investor" and "expropriation" under Chapter
1 1, this arbitration panel could find that a legally constituted jury's decision was

" N A F T A - ~ I I ~ ~A
~ Iverdict
. " ' ~ ~in favor of Loewen will go much farther than the
principles of "Most Favored Nation" or "National Treatment" because a US citizen could
not appeal a jury decision in this manner. Here, the corporation is truly receiving extra
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rights greater than those afforded to the citizen of that nation, or the citizens of any
nation.
There is a prior case decided under NAFTA with similar facts, but a different
outcome. Azinian v. Mexico was decided by an ICSID panel in 1999, and held that
NAFTA should not be used as a court of appeals for unsatisfied investors.245There, a
group of US investors misrepresented themselves in a contract to provide waste removal
services for the Mexican city of Naucalpan, which the city repudiated when it discovered
the misrepresentation. A Mexican court held that the city of Naucalpan was justified in
not performing the contract. When Azianian sued under Chapter 11, the arbitration panel
dismissed the suit because it held that breach of contract was not sufficient to establish a
NAFTA claim. Furthermore, it stated that NAFTA should not be a court of appeals for
disappointed investors, and that Article 1105 must be accompanied by a clear violation of
international law, independent of NAFTA.'~~

5. Poue and Talbot v. Canada
Pope and Talbot operated three sawmills in British Columbia, and is based in
Oregon. The company exports softwood timber from Canada to the US, and thus its
exports are governed by the Canadian government under the U.S.-Canada Agreement on
Trade in Softwood Lumber and enter duty-free up to a quota ( " ~ ~ r e e m e n t " ) . 'The
~~
Agreement was created to avoid a trade war on lumber between the US and Canada. The
government owns the majority of Canada's forests, and Canada has been accused of
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setting artificially low prices for timber extraction, thus driving down the price of lumber
coming from ~ a n a d a . * ~ ~
On March 25, 1999, Pope and Talbot filed a Chapter 11 claim against the
Canadian government."9

The complaint alleged that Canada violated the company's

rights because of the manner in which it implemented the ~greement.~"The specific
violations were 1) that the quota system in Canada violated the national treatment under
Article 1 102 and 2) that the minimum standard of treatment under Article 1105 was
violated, too.25' Additionally, the system imposed performance requirements on the
company under Article 1106. Finally, the company argued that its investment was
expropriated under Article 1110. In an amended submission to the UNCITRAL panel, it
claimed $381 million in damages.252The argument has been characterized as boiling
down to "while Pope & Talbot obtained treatment similar to other companies in British
Columbia, it was treated less favorably than logging companies that operate in other parts
of Canada that are not subject to the quotas of the Softwood Lumber ~ g r e e m e n t . " ~ ' ~
The arbitral panel issued a final ruling on April 10,2001, granting relief to Pope
& Talbot under the national treatment and minimum standards of treatment, but denying

the other claims.2s4 The panel ruled that Canada acted unreasonably in asking the
company to procurement certain documents in Canada, rather than in the US. The panel
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went on characterize the relationship between the company and Canada as hostile and
combative, rather than cooperative.
This ruling again departs from the intent of the drafters of NAFTA. Canada
presented evidence that the standard for government conduct to violate Article 1105 must
be "egregious and amount to a willful neglect of duty or an insufficiency of governmental
action that every reasonable and impartial person would recognize as in~ufficient."~'~
Normally, extreme behavior of a country, like destruction in a time of warfare, will meet
this standard. This arbitral ruling made a perception of rudeness by a government against
a corporation possible NAFTA violation.256
In March 200 1, the governments did not renew the Agreement, although the US
tried. At the time of writing, the dispute over timber is threatening to reach the point of a
trade war between the US and ~ a n a d a . ~ ~ '

6. Other Cases Filed. Final Decisions Pending
There are at least nine other cases filed and now before an ICSID or UNCITRAL
Investors have filed claims against all three signatory countries. Their claims
include expropriation based on ground water regulations in Canada (Sun Belt v. British
~ o l u r n b i a )expropriation
;~~~
of market share of MTBE (even though the company does

not produce Methanex, but a chemical needed for its production) in gasoline from a
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California phase-out (Methanex v.

use of NAFTA to appeal a sovereign

immunity defense of Massachusetts for lost potential profits (Mondev v. Cifyof
based on Canada Post's alleged violations of competition
~ o s t o n ) ;expropriation
~~'
policy, monopolies and state run enterprises in Chapter 15 of NAFTA (UPS v. Canadian
violations of national treatment and performance requirements

Postal

because of requirement to use US steel to receive federal highway funds (ADF Group v.
Buy ~ r n e r i c a ) ;expropriation
*~~
based on the revocation of waste disposal contract (Waste
Management v. ~exico)?" failure to pay tax rebates from sale of cigarettes (Karpa v.
based on quotas in the Softwood Agreement (Ketcham
~ e x i c o ) ; ' ~expropriations
'
Investments, Inc. ef.al. v.

and, expropriation of land after a Mexican court

determined reported owners did not have good title to land (Adarns, et. al. v. ~ e x i c o ) . ~ ~ '

Conclusion
These cases stand in marked contrast to those brought before the NAALC.
Fifteen cases have been brought so far. The corporate win column stands at four, while
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its loss column is at only one. And many commentators suggest that that case, Azinain,
should have been di~missed?~'Ten are still undecided, but the odds are in favor of the
corporations winning. The NAALC cases do not have a win or loss column because the
abuses continue to happen while substantive relief is in the no-man's-land of "ministerial
consultations."
Chapter 11 offers investors redress for loss profits through a procedure that can
give them direct results against the offending country.269Because the arbitration panels
are interpreting the wording of NAFTA to embody a wider definition of "expropriation"
than the drafters of NAFTA possibly intended, investors can be sure to collect monetary
damages if their investment is infringed upon.270 In Pope & Talbot, the company was
able to collect because the government of Canada was rude to them.*" S.D. Myers
owned no property in Canada, yet the arbitration panel determined that its "investment,"
importing chemicals made in Canada to the US, was infringed upon enough to collect
monetary damages when Canada passed laws protecting its citizens from environmental

con tarn in ant^.^'^

Finally, a jury award that caused a company to settle out of court might

soon be considered a governmental "measure" under Chapter 11 in the Loewen case?"
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This definition "measure" is more expansive than the meaning in Chapter 11
itself?74 Therefore, the Arbitrators are in effect violating the Vienna Convention on the
Interpretation of ~reaties.~"The interesting point is that what they are doing, however,
is completely legal and the established international norm. Commercial arbitration,
including when a company sues a foreign nation, is the preferred way to settle disputes
However, in the commercial setting the arbitration panels apply a
certain body of law, usually a specific nation's law. Under Chapter 11, the arbitral panels
are applying NAFTA law without reference to what the drafters of NAFTA intended?77
This amounts to an erosion of democracy. Chapter 11 of NAFTA should be
revised to clarify what the drafters meant by "tantamount to" expropriation?'* If the
governments of Canada, Mexico and the US really meant for a company's potential
profits, even when it has not signed a contract to sell or produce goods or services, to be
the basis for expropriation relief, then the citizens of the different countries should know
about it.

Comparing Chapter 11 and NAALC provides a useful way to explore the
priorities of the drafters of NAFTA. Chapter 11 was created to protect the interests of
investors or multinational corporations.279NAALC was created to protect the interests of
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the men and women who might work for those multinational corp~rations?'~The
answers to two questions suggest that the drafters of NAFTA wanted to protect the
interests of investors more than the working men and women of Canada, Mexico and the
United States.

Who Decides?
Under Chapter 11, an arbitration panel composed of international commercial law
experts hears the complaint by the investor. The panels usually follow a procedure like
that of other arbitration panels, however, it is up to the panel to decide exactly what is
allowed or not?"

Both the investor and the government are usually allowed to file briefs

and give testimony to prove their case. Additionally, both sides are usually afforded
limited discovery to investigate the claims of the other side.
Under NAALC, the complaining party submits its complaint to a govenunental
agency, an NAO.*" The NAOs have defined their role as primarily fact gatherers and

The NAOs do not have subpoena power,

providers of a forum to discuss the

nor is there a formal discovery process whereby one side can obtain information about
the other

Additionally, the governments themselves have political concerns that

the arbitration panels do not. The decision whether to pursue action against another
country for alleged violations of that country's own labor laws is a delicate decision that
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includes many different factors.28sThe arbitration panel is generally free of political
concerns about its decision to punish one side or the other.
Therefore, the Chapter 11 investors have a much more efficient and guaranteed
mechanism to recover their lost investments than workers have to complain about
violations of their rights. What investors and workers have recovered also demonstrates
that NAFTA favors investors over workers.

What Can an Aggrieved Person Expect to Recover?
An aggrieved investor can expect swift recovery under Chapter 11. The cases
decided thus far demonstrate that multinational corporations have successfully described
their enterprises as "investments" and the cause of their loss as governmental "measures"
as defined by Chapter 11. An UNCIRAL panel in the Ethyl case and an ICSID panel in
the Metalclad case held that environmental regulation was a governmental "measure"
"tantamount to expropriation."286 S.D. Myers was able to convince an UNCITRAL panel
that, although it did not have a contract signed to do so, its past practice of importing a
chemical from Canada to the US was an "investment" under Chapter 11. Therefore,
Canada's decision to ban the import or export of the chemical was a governmental
"measure" and S.D. Myers was entitled to money damages.2s7 Pope & Talbot recovered
millions of dollars from Canada after an arbitration panel held that Canada was
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uncooperative with the company.288 All these cases show that governmental regulations
that infringe upon, investors may be violations of Chapter 11, and an aggrieved investor
can recover money damages from that government.
However, aggrieved workers have not been compensated in the same manner
under NAALC. The violations of Mexican labor law in the Maquiladora zone submitted
to the US NAO have resulted in public hearings, tri-national seminars on labor law and
ministerial consultations. In a few cases, the individual workers have benefited by
having their union recognized?89 However, these cases are overshadowed by the
majority of cases where either action on the part of the US NAO is too late to help the
workers because they were fired too long ago, they are already injured or the action taken
simply did not affect the injured workers. What workers, and especially labor rights
groups, can expect to gain through a NAALC submission is increased awareness of the
labor abuses that occur in the Maquiladora zone?g0 This may not be the millions of
dollars that investors recover through Chapter 11 filings, but it is nonetheless important.

NAALC is still unique in that it allows interest groups to use a trade agreement to
promote international labor standards. However, it shows the bias towards protecting
investors under NAFTA.
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